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"Financial Fair Play" or "Oligopoleague" of Football Clubs?:  




How to kill "football-business"?  
 
The UEFA, the trade association of 54 European football leagues, has a plan. Its name is the 
"Financial Fair Play" Regulation (hereinafter "the FPPR").1 Under the FFPR "break-even 
requirement", football clubs cannot spend more than they earned in previous seasons.2 In 
practice, if Real Madrid generated a €500 million revenue in year X, (tickets sponsorship, TV 
rights, merchandising, etc.), its expenses in year Y cannot exceed €500 million. And the 
Standard Liege, whose revenues were in the ballpark of €25 million in year X, will face in 
year Y a spending cap of €25 million.3 Clubs that do not comply with the break-even 
requirement are exposed to a battery of sanctions: fines, ban on new players purchases, 
exclusion from the Champions League and from the Europa League, etc. A few weeks ago, 
the UEFA slapped Manchester City, Paris Saint-Germain and 6 other clubs with fines up to 
€60 million…4 
 
At first glance, there are sound justifications for the break-even rule. With it, the UEFA seeks 
to guarantee clubs long-term financial stability by forcing them to "keep their wage bill under 
control" by  “lowering salary costs and/or limiting the number of players under contract"5 In 
other words, the idea is to reduce "player costs" (transfer fees, agents' fees, wages, etc.), 
which have exploded in recent years. Moreover, the break-even requirement will arguably 
promote a competitive balance amongst clubs, by making sure they compete "on an equal 
footing".6 In short, the idea is to prevent "fake" financial competition from taking precedence 
over "true" sports competition.  
 
Clearly, Financial Fair Play is in the spirit of times. In recent years, spending discipline – in 
layman words, "austerity" – has been the mantra of contemporary economic policies across 
the globe (eg, in fiscal matters, in banking, etc.).7 But, Financial Fair Play falls too in the 
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ambit of law. And there are good grounds to believe that it violates both the spirit and the 
letter of the European Union ("EU") competition rules. 
 
First, because several economic studies report that the break-even rule will distort competition 
by giving rise to an "ossification" of the market structure. In plain words, the break-even rule 
cements, freezes, congeals the clubs' existing financial positions. As a result, the "big" clubs – 
those with currently the highest revenues – are given an unparalleled advantage over the 
"small" clubs – those with currently the lower revenues – because the latter can no longer use 
debt to make investments similar to the former.8 In our example, Real Madrid can hire almost 
5 Cristiano Ronaldo for €96 million. But Standard Liege cannot even afford a third of his 
transfer price. With this, what the FFPR promotes is the emergence of an "oligopoleague" of 
big wealthy clubs within the UEFA competitions.9 Those clubs will enjoy a paramount 
position in the upstream input market for the purchase of players. And this will likely yield a 
cascade of anticompetitive "side effects" on downstream “secondary” markets (tickets, 
subscriptions and merchandising bought by supporters, fans and others, sponsoring, TV 
rights, mobile telephony rights, internet rights, etc.). 
 
Second, because the genuine anticompetitive nature of the break-even rule hits the core centre 
of the prohibition rule found in Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union ("TFEU"). The UEFA is indeed an "association of undertakings" within the meaning 
of Article 101.10 And the break-even rule is an unlawful "limitation of investments" as set out 
in Article 101 paragraph b) TFEU. Surely, the FFPR does not limit all investments, but only 
those that yield debt (spending>revenues). That said, Article 101 paragraph d) prohibits any 
concerted limitation of investments, regardless of its type, magnitude and/or effects. And this 
is understandable. In real life markets, debt is a conventional strategy to finance productive 
investments, and a driver of market competition. 
 
Third, because the case-law of the EU Commission and the Court has repeatedly held that a 
concerted limitation of investments is by its very nature ("by object") unlawful. In Brasseries 
Kronenbourg and Brasseries Heineken, the Commission sanctioned as a hard-core 
infringement an agreement whereby two rival breweries had jointly agreed to halt investments 
in downstream capacities.11 Similarly, in Irish Beef, the EU Court of Justice held that a "crisis 
cartel" that sought to reduce overinvestment was a restriction of competition by "object" 
contrary to Article 101(1) TFUE.12 
 
Of course, in EU competition law, firms liable for a potential infringement of Article 101(1) 
TFEU remain free to rebut the allegation, by bringing forward justifications for their conduct. 
A first possibility is to assert a defence under the exemption clause of Article 101(3) TFEU. 
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 See, in particular, Thomas PEETERS et Stefan SZYMANSKI, T. PEETERS, et S. SZYMANSKI, (2013) 
“Financial fair play in European football”, Working Papers 2013 021, University of Antwerp, Faculty of Applied 
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 In this particular respect, the break even requirement differs from "salary cap" agreements (those that apply, 
for instance in the United States) which reduce the ratio "players spending - revenue" of about 15% and, in turn, 
maintain a certain balance between sport clubs within a same league. 
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 See T- 193/02, Laurent Piau v Commission, 26 January 2005, Rec. 2005 p. II-209, §71 and 72. 
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 See Decision of the Commission of 29 September 2004, COMP/C.37750/B2 – Brasseries Kronenbourg, 
Brasseries Heineken, OJ L 184 of 15 July 2005, pp. 57-59. 
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  See C- 209/07, Competition Authority v Beef Industry Development Society Ltd et Barry Brothers Meat Lt., 
20 November 2008, Rec. 2008 p. I-08637, §21. 
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However, in practice, this defence is inapplicable in cases of by "object" restrictions of 
competition, all the more so for horizontal agreements like the FFPR.13 
 
Another possibility is to invoke the protection of the Wouters14 and Meca-Medina 
judgments.15  Under this stream of case law, the applicability of Article 101(1) TFEU can be 
defused if the restriction of competition is "inherent" in the pursuit of the objectives of the 
regulation, and if it is "proportionate". 
 
However, far from placing clubs on "equal footing" as the stated objective of the FFPR, the 
break even rule creates an asymmetry amongst football clubs: the rich clubs can make major 
investments, the poor ones not. This could even be akin to an additional violation of 
competition law, this time of Article 101(1) TFEU paragraph d), which outlaws decisions of 
associations of undertakings that create a "competitive disadvantage” in the market.  
 
In addition to failing the "inherency" test, the break-even rule also fails the "proportionality" 
test. In the economic literature, less restrictive alternatives have been proposed: bank 
guarantees, "luxury tax" on overspending (eg, 10 cents/€ of overspending),16 etc.17 The 
disproportionality is further aggravated by the proposed prohibition of third party co-
investment.18 In brief, the UEFA wants to prevent third parties – banks, financial institutions, 
sponsors, etc. – from co-investing with a club in the purchase of players. According to the 
UEFA, this supplementary prohibition is necessary to ensure the effectiveness of the break-
even rule. 
 
Against this backdrop, it has been reported in the press that a football player's agent is 
challenging the validity of the FFPR break-even rule before a court in Brussels.19  In his 
action, the applicant has requested the Brussels court to send a preliminary reference to the 
CJEU in Luxemburg, to seek the latter's views on the compatibility of the FFPR with EU 
competition law. 20 Given the complex and intrinsically pan-European nature of the issue, the 
CJEU is indeed the best placed judicial expert to handle this matter, and the sole competent 
court to rule authoritatively on the interpretation of the TFEU. Once again, it is all in Brussels' 
hands… 
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 In an informal letter in 2012 Mr. Almunia, Vice-President the European Commission in charge of competition, 
assimilated the prohibition of "over- spending" set out in the FFPR to the prohibition of State aid under Article 
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Joaquin Almunia to Michel Platini: 
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